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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
RAY KEITH SUDBURY, and
RUTH JEAN SUDBURY,
Plaintiffs and AppelZants,

vs.
OLAF THEODORE
STEVENSEN, JR., and
BARBARA ANN
STEVENSEN,

Case No. 9220

Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On J~anuary 28, 1960, a summary judgment
was entered in favor of defendants . Plaintiffs appeal from that judgment.
Prior to June, 1958, plaintiffs and defendants
were engaged in the business of conducting Ollies
Terrace Room in Salt Lake City, Utah, as a limited
partnership. Keith Sudbury and Olaf Theodore Stevensen, Jr., (hereinafter called Ted Stevensen) were
general partners and each owned a forty per cent
interest in and to the assets of said partnership.
Ruth Jean Sudbury and Barbara Ann Stevensen
1
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each owned a ten per cent interest in the assets of
said partnership. (Exhibit P-8, R. 34)
In the month of June, 1958, the parties entered into and executed the agreement of sale, a
copy of which is marked Exhibit "A" and attached
to plaintiffs' complaint. The agreement provides
for the purchase by defendants of the undivided
one-half interest in and to the partnership assets
owned by plaintiffs for the total sum of $36,200.00~
(R. 5) The downpayment of $10,791.59 was paid
by defen·dants assuming and paying the sum of
$4,591.59 that represented plaintiffs' sh'are of the
then existing obligations of the partnership, the
cancellation by defendants of the sum of $·2,500.00
owed by plaintiffs to defendants and by the payment of the sum of $3,700.00 in cash. (R. 6) The
balance of $25,408.41 under the terms of said agreement was to be paid in weekly installments of
$100.00, the first installment of which became due
on September 1, 1958. Under the terms of the agreement defendants were granted a grace period of
fifteen weeks. Defendants used the entire grace
period before making any of the installment payments.
The first weekly installment that became due
after the expiration of the fifteen week grace period
was on December 15, 1958. On December 8, 1958,
defendants paid plaintiffs the sum of $300.00 (Ex-
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hi bit P-3) This payment represented three weekly
installments. Thereafter defendants paid the weekly
installments down to and including the installment
th·at became due on July 27, 1959.
On August 10, 1959, defendants delivered a
check to plaintiffs in the amount of $'200.00. This
check represented the payment that became due on
August 3rd and the payment that became due on
August 10, 1959. At the same time defendants delivered to plaintiffs a series of checks that were
post dated one week apart beginning with August
17, 1959. That after August 10, 1959, and prior
to August 17, 19'59, plaintffs presented said $200.00
check (Exhibit P-1) to the First Sectlrity Bank of
Utah, N.A., Main at First South Branch, and the
same was wrongfully dishonored by said bank and
was marked "refer to maker". On Monday, August
17, 1959, plaintiff, Keith Sudbury, presented the
August 10, 1959, check (Exhibit P-1) in the amount
of $200.00 and the August 17, 1959, check (Exhibit
P-2) in the amount of $100.00 for payment. The
bank on that day wrongfully refused to honor the
checks.
On the same day the bank dishonored both of
said checks, Keith Sudbury consulted Mr. George
Bridwell, one of the attorneys for plaintiffs, relative to his rights under said agreement. The letter
dated August 17, 1959, (Exhibit P-4) was written
3
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

on the date it bears and was delivered by Keith
Sudbury to one of Ted Stevensen's employees sometime within the next week. Defendants were in
Europe on a vacation at the time Exhibit P-4 was
delivered. The defendants returned from Europe
immediately after Exhibit P-4 was delivered, and
on September 1, 1959, defendants made a tender
to pllaintiffs of all installments that were due under
the agreement of sale as of that day. Plaintiffs refused to accept the tender of said weekly installments and returned the $500.00 so tendered to defendant's attorney on September 11, 195'9, together
with a letter (Exhibit P-5) from Mr. Reynolds,
one of plaintiffs' attorneys.
Plaintiffs' complaint was filed on November
10, 1959, seeking a forfeiture of not only the onehalf interest in the property purchased by defendants from plaintiffs but also the one-half interest
in said property that defendants owned in their
own right prior to S'aid agreement of sale.
On January 18, 1960, defendants paid the sum
of $2,500.00 in the form of a cashier's check to the
clerk of the court with instructions to deliver the
same to plaintiffs or their attorney upon request.
This $·2,500.00 represented all weekly installments
that were then due under the agreement. On January 20, 1960, at the time of the argument of the
motions for summary judgment, defend·ants through
4
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their attorney and in open court again tendered
to plaintiffs said $2,500.00. ( R. 25) Plaintiffs refused to accept s·aid tender.
The foregoing statement of fact is undisputed.
Plaintiffs claim in their brief that defendants were
eighteen weeks delinquent in the payment of the
weekly installments as of August 17, '1959, when
First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., dishonored the
checks of August 10 and August t7, 19'59. This
statement is not correct because it ignores, as is
readily apparent from reading plaintiffs' brief, the
fact that defendants were granted a fifteen week
grace period. When the bank wrongfully dishonored
defendants' two checks on August 17th, defendants
were delinquent only three payments; namely, the
August 3, August 10 and August 1'7, 19'59, payments. No matter which way it is stated, all p~arties
agree that had the bank honored the checks on August 17, 1959, as it should have done, defendants
would not have been in default under the agreement
in question.
STATEMENT OF P·OINTS
P·OINT I
THE "AGREElVIENT OF SALE" TIHAT IS THE
SUBJECT OF THIS ACTION IS IN LEGAL EFFECT A
CHATTEL M·ORTGAGE AND NOT A CONDITIONAL
SALES CONTRACT.
POINT II
THE OPTION TO ACCELERATE PAYMENTS AND
5
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MAKE ENTIRE DEBT DUE WAS NOT EXERCISED
BY PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENDANTS ARE NOT IN
DEFAULT UNDER THE AGREEMENT.
P·OINT III
FORECIJOSURE IS PLAINTIFFS' EXCLUSIVE
REMEDY UNDER THE AGREEMENT IN QUEST}ON.
POINT IV
ANS'WER TO PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF.

ARGUMENT
P·OINT I
THE "AGREEMENT OF SALE" THAT IS THE
SUBJECT OF THIS ACTION IS IN LEGAL EFFECT A
c·HATTEL MORTGAGE AND NOT A CONDITIONAL
SALES CONTRACT.

All parties agree that the agreement in question was one of sale and was not an agreement to
sell. Title to plaintiffs' one-half interest in the property sold passed to defendants at the time of the
execution of the agreement. (R. 4, par. II, plaintiffs' brief p. 16) Immediately following the execution of the agreement of sale, defendants owned the
entire legal title to all of the property described in
the agreement.
The first question the trial court was faced
with in this case was to determine whether the
agreement in question was in legal effect a '·'chattel
mortgage" or a "conditional sales contract".
In answering this question there are certain
basic rules that must be kept in mind.
6
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INTENTION OF THE PARTIES
1. "'VTv'"hether a particular transaction is a conditional sale or a chattel mortgage, in the final analysis, depends on the intention of the parties, which
is to be ascertained from their conduct, the attendant circumstances, and the terms of the agreement.
The above rule is announced in the annotation entitled, "What amounts to conditional sale" in 175
A.L.R. 1366 at p·age 1378.
IF DOUBTFUL, MORTGAGE PREFERRED
2. Where it is doubtful from the face of an
instrument whether the contract is a conditional
sale or mortgage, the courts generally treat it as a
mortgage, for the reason that such construction is
most apt to attain the ends of justice and prevent
fraud and oppression. The cases cited in 175 A.L.R.
1366 announce and demonstrate this rule. To the
same effect see Kliks v. Courtemanche, 150 Ore. 332,
4·3 P. 2d 913; Great American Indemnity Comp~any
v. Utility Contractors, 21 Tenn. App. 46'3, 111 S.W.
2d 901; 9'2 A.L.R. 311. Consistent with this general attitude of the courts is the attitude of the Utah
Supreme Court as declared in the case of Green v.
Pallfreyman, 109 U. 291, 166 P. 2d 215, where
it said,
"Forfeitures are not favored, and in interpreting an agreement, every reasonable
presumption should be indulged against an
intention to allow a forfeiture."
7
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To the same effect see Peterson v. !-lodges, 121
U. 7·2, 239 P. 2d 180.
PASSING OF TITLE
3. Did title pass under terms of the agreement at the time of its execution or was title retained by the plaintiffs, as security for the payment
of the purchase price? Did the agreement in question constitute a sale or is it a "contract to sell"?
Our court in Middleton v. Evans, 86 U. 3'96, 45 P.
'2d 570, points up the difference by using the following language,
"In a contract to sell, the parties agree
to transfer property and goods ,at some future time, whereas in a sale, th~ parties agree
to transfer property presently~~'
a.
states,

The annotation in 175 A.L.R. at page 1380
"That a simple retention of title to the
chattel sold, in the seller, usually evidences a
conditional sale, in the absence of provisions
more consistent with a mortgage."

This ·annotation also demonstrates quite clearly
that if title is not retained by the seller and if it is
apparent from the instrument involved that the intention was to pass title that then the effect of the
transaction is th·at it is a chattel mortgage and not
a condition~al s.ale.
8
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CANNOT BE BOTH A CHATTEL MORTGAGE
AND A CONDITIONAL SALES CONTRACT
4. The agreement cannot be both a chattel
mortgage and a conditional sales contract.
a. The court in Ferkins v. Skates, 220
Ala. 216, 124 S. 514, announces the rule that the
relationship of conditional vendor and vendee, and
o'f mortgagee and mortgagor, cannot subsist as to
the same property at the same time. The state of
the title and the incidence of the transaction are
widely different.
A condition·al sales contract by definition is
one where title is retained by the seller until the
purchase price is paid or until the happening of
some other specified event. An examination of the
agreement involved in this case adequately demonstrates an·d all of the parties to this lawsuit agree
that the plaintiffs did not retain title to their onehalf interest in the property, but on the contrary it
was the intention of the parties that title pass at
the time of the execution of the agreement. That
fact in and of itself would probably prevent the
agreement in question from having the legal effect
of a condition·al sales contract.
Paragraph V of the agreement (R. 7) provides
that defendants will give plaintiffs a chattel mortgage on not only the one-half interest in the property
that defendants were purchasing but also on the
9
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one-half interest in the property th·at defend'ants
already owned prior to the agreement. The strict
foreclosure provision of the agreement contained
in Paragraph VI, (A) provides that in the event
of default that plaintiffs would be permitted to sell
not only the property they l1ad sold to defendants
but also defendants' one-h·alf interest that they already owned, and that plaintiffs would be entitled
to retain all of the proceeds from that sale. The
forfeiture provision contained in Paragraph VI, (B)
provides that in the event of default the buyers will
not only forfeit their interest in the one-half interest
purchase from plaintiffs but that the buyers will
also forfeit their one-half interest in the property
that they already owned prior to the agreement.
The agreement clearly contemplates that plaintiffs will acquire a security interest in not only the
one-half interest in the property that they sold to
defendants but that they will also get a security
interest in the one-half interest in the property that
was owned by the defendants. By the terms of the
agreement title to plaintiffs' interest in the property
passed immediately to the defendants. Plaintiffs
never did have title to the one-half interest that was
owned by defendants, so the only way that plaintiffs
could possibly get a security interest in the one-half
interest owned by the defendants prior to the execution of the agreement would be for the defendants
10
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to give the plaintiffs a chattel mortgage on such interest. Since title to the one-half interest sold passed
at the time of the execution of the agreement, the
only way the plaintiffs could acquire a security interest in the property sold was for defendants to
give plaintiffs a chattel mortgage back. It would
be inconsistent to hold that plaintiffs had a chattel
mortgage on the one-half interest belonging to defendants originally and had a conditional sales contract on the one-half interest that they sold to defendants. Defendants never did execute and deliver
a chattel mortgage as called for by the agreement;
however, an agreement to execute a mortgage in
equity is deemed a mortgage as between the parties.
The agreement is inconsistent. Paragraph V
of the agreement provides that defendants will give
plaintiffs a chattel mortgage on all of the property
that constitutes Ollies Terrace Room. Paragraph VI,
(A) provides that in the event of default the chattel
mortgage may be foreclosed and all of the property
(which would include defendants one-half interest)
can be sold and all of the money realized therefrom
retained by plaintiffs. This in effect is a provision
for a strict foreclosure of the chattel mortgage.
Paragraph VI, (B) provides that in the event of a
default defendants will forfeit not only all of their
interest in the property they purchased from plaintiffs but also all of their interest in the property
11
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they owned prior to the agreement in question. This
provision is a forfeiture provision and is one that
is common to a conditional sales contract. As we
have already seen an instrument in legal effect
cannot be both a chattel mortgage and a conditional
sales contract. It must be one or the other. In the
event of a default, the methods of enforcing a chattel
mortgage are entirely different than the methods of
enforcing a conditional sales contract.
Construing the agreement as a mortgage instead of a conditional sale will do justice to the parties. Defendants will be required to pay the balance
due under the agreement. Plaintiffs will get their
money and defendants will retain their business.
The trial court in finding of fact No. 5 ( R. 35)
and in its conclusion of law (R. 36) and in its
judgment (R. 3'7) foun·d as a fact that it was the
intention of the parties that the agreement in question have the effect of a chattel mortgage, and the
court held that it in legal effect was a chattel mortgage. ·we think the court was clearly right in so
holding.
POINT II
THE OPTION TO ACCELERATE PAYMENTS AND
MAKE ENTIRE DEBT DUE WAS NOT EXERCISED
BY PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENDANTS ARE N'OT IN
DEFAULT UNDER THE AGREEMENT.

The trial court has found :and properly so that
the agreement in legal effect is a chattel mortgage.
1q

L ..:...
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That being so the question then arises was the option
to accelerate the payments and make the entire debt
due exercised? In determining the answer to this
question certain things should be kept in mind.
OPTIONAL OR AUTOMATIC ACCELE'RATION
1. Paragrph VI (A) of the agreement provides that in the event of default the "Sellers may,
at their option, declare the whole of the unpaid balance under this agreement at once due and payable" * * *. It should be noted that this provision
gives the seller an option to accelerate the payments
in the event of default. It does not provide that in
the event of default the p-ayments are automatically
accelerated without any act on the part of the sellers.
10 C.J.S. Sec. 251 (c), page 749, states the
rule as follows,
"An acceleration clause may be absolute
or optional in form. If absolute, maturity occurs on the happening of the specified default; if optional, maturity does not occur
until the exercise of the option."
To the same effect see the annotation in 159
A.L.R., 1077 entitled Acceleration of Note or Mortgage as Automatic or Optional, where the rule is
stated at page 1091, as follows:
"It has been uniformly held that a provision in a note or mortgage accelerating the
maturity for non-payment of interest or installments, or other default, at the option of
13
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the holder or the mortgagee, is not self executing but requires some action on the part
of the holder or mortgagee without which the
amount will not become due."
AFFIRMATIVE DECLARATION NECESSARY
2. What is essential to the proper exercise of
an option to accelerate maturity?
a.

The general rule is stated in 5 A.L.R.

2d 968,
"That a provision in a bill or note accelerating the maturity thereof on nonpayment of
interest or installments, or other default at
the option of the holder, requires some affirmative action on the part of the holder, evidencing his election to take advantage of the
accelerating provision, and that until such
action has been taken the provision has no
operation. In other words, some positive action on the part of the holder is an essential
condition for the exercise of his option and a
mere mental intention to declare the full
amount due is not sufficient."
b. As demonstrated by the annotation in
5 A.L.R. 2d 968, it is uniformly held that it is essential for a valid exercise of an option to accelerate
the maturity of a bill or note or an installment under
a contract that the holder or payee or the seller do
some positive act to indicate the exercise of the
option.
DECLARATION NOT SUFFICIENT TO ACCELERATE UNLESS FOLLOWED BY AFFIRMA14
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TIVE ACT TOWARD ENFORCING DECLARED
INTENTION.
3. The next question is, what constitutes a
positive act on the part of a person who is exercising the option to accelerate?
a. On page 9'72 of 5 A.L.R. 2d the general rule is stated,
"While it is impossible to formulate a
hard and fast rule by which each act can be
immediately classified in regard to its sufficiency, the test seems to be the definiteness
and finality of the holders action as expression of his election. Stated generally, the rule
is that the exercise of the option must be
made in a manner so clear and unequivocal
as to leave no doubt as to the holders intention and to apprise the maker effectively of
the fact that the option has been exercised."
(See to the same effect Union Central Life
Insurance Company v. A,dams, 169 Okla. 57'2,
38 P. 2d 76.)
b. In 36 Am. Jur., Sec. 393, p. 884 the
rule is stated as follows:
"The general rule is that where the acceleration of the maturity of a mortgage debt
on default is made optional with the mortgagee, some affirmative action must be taken
by him evidencing his election to take advantage of the accelerating provision, and that
until sucl1 action has been taken, the provision has no operation. (See cases cited under
Note 1'8, page 884 of 36 Am. Jur.) The exercise of the option should be made in a man15
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ner clear and unequivocal, so as to leave no
doubt as to the mortgagees intention* * *even
a declaration may be a sufficient exercise of
the option, but to be effective, the declaration
must be followed by an affirmative act toward enforcing the declared intention."
A mere declaration of intention to accelerate
is not sufficient but to be effective 'as stated by the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma in Union Central Life
Insurance Company v. Adams, 169 Okl. 572, 38 P.
2d 26,
"The declaration must be followed by an
affirmative act towards enforcing the declared intention."
WHO MAY EXERCISE OPTION
4. Who may elect to exercise the option to accelerate the p'ayments?
a. In 59 C.J.S., Sec. 495 (5) (d) the
rule is stated,
"The terms of the deed of trust or mortgage control as to the person who may elect
to accelerate the maturity of the debt secured
* * * joint owners of a mortgage must join
in an election. (See Seligman v. Berg, 251
N.Y. Supp. 689; B.each v. Tangier Hotel Company, 179 N.Y. Supp. 657.)
In 10 C.J.S., Sec. 251 (d) p. 750, the rule is
stated,
"WHO MAY EXERCISE 0 P T I 0 N.
* * * Where under the provisions of the instrument, only the holders of the note can
16
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declare the entire indebtedness mature, if
there are more than one holder a unanimous
exercise of the option is required, and anything short of th·a t is ineffective."
TENDER BEFORE OPTION EFFECTIVELY
EXERCISED.
5. What is the effect of a tender of the sum
as to which there has been a default if the tender
is made before the option to accelerate is exercised?

The law is to the effect that a tender of the
sum as to which there has been a default, if made
before the option to accelerate is exercised, bars acceleration of the maturity of the debt secured by the
mortgage. In 59 C.J.S., Sec. 495 (6) (b) the rule
is stated.
"A tender of the sum as to which there
has been a default, if made before election
to accelerate, bars acceleration of the maturity of the debt secured by the mortgage or
deed of trust."
Our Utah Court in the case of Home Owners
Loan Corporation v. Washington, 180 U. 469, 161
P. ·2d 355 (1945) adopts the rule stated above and
in so doing says,
"The law relative to tender under contracts, which provide that in case of default
the holder has the option to declare the whole
amount due, is well set forth in 52 Am. Jur.
page 24·5, Section 41, which is as follows:
'Under a contract which provides that any de17
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fault in the payment of the interest or an installment of the principal when due shall give
the obligee an option to declare the whole
amount due, the general rule is that a tender
of payment of the overdue principal or interest before the option to declare the whole debt
due has been exercised cuts off the right to
exercise the option. Stansbury v. Embr~ey, 128
Tenn. 103, 158 S.W. 991, 47 LRA., N.S. 980;
W.einberg v. Naher, 51 Wash. 591, 99 P. 736.
This is so because the debt does not become
due on the mere default in payment, but by
affirmative action by which the creditor makes
it known to the debtor that he intends to declare the whole debt due."
The Supreme Court of Idaho in the case of Clark
v. Paddock, 24 Ida. 142, 132 P. 795, h·as adopted
the same rule as the Supreme Court of Utah.
In applying the foregoing principles of law to
the case now before this court, it is readily apparent
that the agreement in question gives plaintiffs an
option to accelerate the payments. By the clear terms
of Paragraph V (A) the right to accelerate is an optional one and is not an automatic or a self-executing one. In determining whether or not plaintiffs
effectively exercised the option to accelerate the payments, we should look at the first act claimed by
plaintiffs to constitute such acceleration. That was
the letter of August 17, 1959, Exhibit P-4, from
Keith Sudbury to Ted Stevensen. That letter reads
verbatim as follows:
18
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"Dear Ted:
"Because of First Security Bank's failure
to honor your checks to me, dated August 10th
and 17th, I am electing to accelerate the money
you owe me under our agreement.
"There is due me the sum of $23,506.51,
which I will expect paid to me within a short
time after you return from Europe so that
it will not be necessary for me to foreclose
your equipment or take over the business.
"I am enclosing both of these dishonored
checks to you and I will accept no further
sums less than the full amount due me. For
that reason, I am also en-closing checks dated
August 24th, August 31st, September 7th,
September 14th, and September 21st, each in
the amount of $100.00.
It should be noted from the letter first of all
that it is not an unequivocal statement that Sudbury
elects to accelerate the payments and intends to go
ahead with the mortgage foreclosure. The first paragraph states he elects to accelerate, but the second
paragraph then says that he may foreclose on the
equipment or he may take over the business . Foreclosure of the chattel mortgage is completely inconsistent and completely different than treating the
agreement as a conditional sale and attempting to
enforce the forfeiture provision by taking over the
business as such. To effectively exercise the option
the courts all hold that it must be made in a manner
so clear and unequivocal as to leave no doubt as to
19
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the holders intention and to apprise the defendants
effectively of the fact that the option has been exercised, and in addition to that there must be an affirmative act tovvard enforcing the declared intention. And as stated in 36 Am. Jur., Sec. 393, p. 884,
"Even a declaration may be a sufficient
exercise of the option, but to be effective, the
declaration must be followed by an affirmative act toward enforcing the declared intention."
In this case there has been no affirmative act
by plaintiffs toward enforcing the mortgage by a
foreclosure proceeding. On the contrary plaintiffs
affirmative action has been completely inconsistent
with a foreclosure of the mortgage. Plaintiffs instead of attempting to foreclose have sought all the
way to enforce the forfeiture provisions of the agreement and have attempted to take over the business
lock, stock and barrel. The absolute and clear cut
evidence of this fact is contained in the letter from
Mr. Reynolds, one of the attorneys for plaintiffs,
Exhibit P-5, wherein it states,
"The Sudburys have elected to pursue
their remedies under the terms of the agreement of June, 1958, based upon the default
of your client, Olaf Theodore Stevenson, Jr.,
in failing to make the payments required of
him pursuant to said agreement, and that
the Sudburys have elected to declare a forfeiture of Mr. Stevenson's right, title and
20
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interest in as subject matter of said agreement pursuant to paragraph VI B thereof;
accordingly, demand is hereby made upon you
as attorney for Stevenson for the immediate
delivery of possession to Sudburys of the premises, property goods, chattels and properties
of every kind and character which may be the
subject matter of the agreement of June, 1958,
and for the execution of appropriate instruments of conveyance and transfer of titles
to Sudbury.

you ar.e advis,e,d that Sudburys elect hereby not to enforce the remedy
of foreclos~tre ,and .do elect to purs-ue their
rightful ,alter%ative, namely forfeiture as set
forth in the afores,aid agreement.
"Sp~ecifioally,

"In addition, Sudburys hereby demand
an accounting on the part of your client of all
receipts and disbursements, a balance sheet
and a profit and loss statement applicable
to the operation of the business heretofore
conducted under the name and style, "Ollies
Terrace Room" which business is the subject
matter of the agreement of June 1958, from
the date of this letter over the period to the
date of delivery of possession to Sudburys as
aforesaid.
"Also, you are hereby notified that Sudburys intend to pursue their legal remedies as
against Stevenson for any unlawful detainer
on the part of Mr. Stevenson, which may be
appropriately ·determined.
"Finally, you are hereby advised that
notwithstanding the foregoing Sudburys are
willing to accord Stevenson the right to pay
in full the current remaining balance of prin21
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cipal and interest due on said contract within
30 days from date hereof as an additional
right not provided in said agreement."
Acceleration of all of the unpaid installments
is only necessary in the event plaintiffs elected to
foreclose the chattel mortgage. Acceleration of the
payments would be a necessary condition precedent
to a foreclosure action, while acceleration of the
payments would not be a condition precedent to enforcing a forfeiture. Because plaintiffs, acting
through their attorney, specifically stated that they
elected not to enforce the remedy of foreclosure but
did elect to pursue the remedy of forfeiture, we
submit that no proper exercise of the option to accelerate was ever made by plaintiffs or if it was
ever properly m·ade, it was waived or abandoned.
The declared intention to accelerate contained in
Exhibit P-4 was not followed by affirmative action
toward enforcing the declared intention, but on the
contrary was followed by action inconsistent with
enforcing the declared intention.
It should also be noted that the letter of August 17, 19'59, Exhibit P-4, is from Keith Sudbury
only and is addressed to Ted Stevenson only. Keith
Sudbury's wife owned a ten per cent interest in the
partnership assets and was a party to the agreement in question. Under the rule stated in 59 C.J.S.
Sec. 495 (5) (d) * * * "Joint owners of a mortgage
must join in an election" Sudbury's wife had to
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join in the election to make it effective. Even if the
court were to treat Exhibit P-4 as a valid exercise
of the option so far as the language of it is concerned, it would not be effective because both Sudbury and his wife did not join in the election to
accelerate the payments.
On September 1, 1959, and before any other affirmative act was taken by the Sudburys, a tender
of all delinquent installments under the agreement
was made to the Sudburys. As shown by Mr. Reynolds' letter of September 11, 1959, Exhibit P-5,
the installments so tendered were returned.
On November 10, 1959, plaintiffs filed their
complaint in this action and asked the court to forfeit all of defendants' interests in the entire business and assets covered by the agreement. The complaint does not seek a foreclosure of the chattel
mortgage. Motions for summary judgment were
made by both p·arties and were argued on January
20, 1960. Two days prior to the date of that argument and again on the date of that argument defen·dants made a tender to plaintiffs of all installments that had accrued down to those two dates.
Since no effective exercise of the option to accelerate the payme11ts l1ad been made as of September 1, 1959, and since none had been made as of
January 18, and January 20, of 1960, under the
holding of the Utah Supreme Court in Home Own23
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ers Loan Corporation v. Washington, supra, the
tender of payment of the installments that were
due under the contract cut off the right of the plainiffs to exercise the option to accelerate. That being
true defendants are not in default under the agreement in question.
Defendants at this time stand ready, willing
and able to pay plaintiffs all installments that are
due under said agreement. Defendants would at this
time deposit the installments that are due with the
Clerk of this Court, if to do so would not be a useless act. The letter dated February 2·7, 1960, from
Mr. Reynolds (R. 40) clearly demonstrates that
plaintiffs will not accept the past due installments
until this case is finally determined.
P·OINT III
FORECDOS'URE IS PLAINTIFFS' EXCLUSIVE
REMEDY UNDER THE AGREEMENT IN QUESTION.

The trial court has held that the agreement in
question is in legal effect a chattel mortgage. The
clear and convincing reasons for the trial court so
holding are discussed at length under Point I. If
the trial court was correct, as we think it clearly
was, in the construction it placed on the agreement,
the question then arises what are plaintiffs' remedies under Utah law for the enforcement of a chattel mortgage?
Section 9-1-15 U.C.A., 1953, reads as follows.
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Conditional Sales Excepted- conveyance in nature
of mortgage included.
"The provisions of this title shall not apply to contracts for the possession, use and
conditional purchase of personal property containing a condition that title shall not pass
until full payment of the purchase price; but
shall extend to and include all such bills of
sale, deeds of trust and other conveyance of
personal property as shall have the effect of
a mortgage or lien upon such property."
Section 9-1-5 U.C.A., 1953, provides that a
chattel mortgage may be foreclosed in the manner
provided by law for the foreclosure of mortgages
upon real property or that a chattel mortgage containing a power of sale upon default being made
in the terms or conditions thereof may be foreclosed by advertisement in the manner provided
in Title 9.
Section 78-37-1 U.C.A., 195'3, provides,
"There can be but one action for the recovery of any debt or the enforcement of any
right secured by mortgage upon real estate
or personal property, which action must be
in accordance with the provisions of this chapter. Judgment shall be given adjudging the
amount due, with costs and disbursements,
and the sale of the mortgaged property, or
some part thereof to satisfy said amount and
accruing costs, and directing the sheriff to
proceed and sell the same according to the
provisions of law relating to sales on execu25
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tion, and a special execution or order of sale
shall be issued for that purpose."
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Morgan
v. Layton, 60 U. 280, 208 ·p. 50'5, held that the remedy by foreclosure prescribed by Section 9-1-5
U.C.A., 1953, is the only one in this jurisdiction to
which a creditor can resort in order to enforce his
lien, unless the mortgage contains a power of sale
as provided in Title 9. If the mortgage does contain
a power of sale, Section 9-1-7 U.C.A., 1953, provides the method of advertisement. Section 9-1-9
prescribes the manner of sale, and section 9-1-12
provides that the money realized from the sale shall
be used first to pay the costs and expenses of foreclosure and second the amount of the mortgage debt
and third the balance is to be paid to the owner of
the mortgaged property.
The statute prescribes the sole remedy for the
enforcement of a chattel mortgage. The public policy
of the State of Utah as declared by our legislature
and as restated by our Supreme Court in the Layton
case states there is but two ways to foreclose a chattel mortg~ge, one by advertisement if a power of
sale is contained in the mortgage or by an action
in court to foreclose. In either event the statute is
mandatory that after the costs of foreclosure and
the mortgage debt are paid the balance must be paid
to the mortgagor. Any agreement of the parties to
the contrary to the effect that the plaintiffs would
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have the right to sell all of the property covered by
the agreement and to retain all of the money realized from said sale, is in effect strict foreclosure
and is unenforceable because against the public
policy of this state as declared by our legislature.
Section 9-1-15 U.C.A., 1953, quoted above makes
it clear cut that Title 9 does not apply to conditional
sales contracts but that it does apply with full force
to any instrument no matter what its form that
is in legal effect a chattel mortgage. Since the agreement in question is in legal effect a chattel mortgage, the provisions of Paragraph VI A and VI B
would be and are unenforceable because only the
remedies prescribed by Title 9 U.C.A., 1953, are
available to the owner of a chattel mortgage.
P·OINT IV
ANSWER TO PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF.

Plaintiffs in their brief have failed to cite one
case or any authority or give one reason why the trial
court's construction of the agreement and its holding that it in legal effect was a chattel mortgage is
erroneous. It seems to us that is the first and most
fundamental question involved in this case. Until
the legal effect of the agreement has been determined, it is impossible to define the rights of the
parties. Once the agreement has been construed
and it has been decided whether in legal effect it
is a chattel mortgage or a conditional sales contract,
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then the remedies that are available to plaintiffs
in the event of default can be spelled out. Until the
agreement is construed and until its legal effect
is determined, the court has no basis for determining what remedies are available nor has it any basis
for determining whether or not there was a default
on the part of the defendants or whether or not
that default may have been cured. If the legal effect
of the agreement is that of a chattel mortgage, then
it is clear that notwithstanding any agreements of
the parties to the contrary, the plaintiffs' remedy
is to foreclose in accordance with the statute. If
the legal effect of the agreement were determined
to be a conditional sales contract, then we would
have to look to the law governing the remedies under conditional sales contracts to determine what
remedies are available to plaintiffs. In general if
a buyer defaults under a conditional sales contract
the seller has an election to sue for the balance due
under the contract or if the contract so provides,
he has the right to retain the amounts already paid
as liquidated damages and to retake possession of
the property. This latter remedy is available unless
the retaking possession of the property and retention of the amounts paid amounts to a penalty and
would therefore be unenforceable.
Plaintiffs main attack on the ruling of the
trial court is to the effect that the trial court has
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rewritten the contract. Plaintiffs' argument in that
regard is completely without basis. The trial court
has not rewritten any contract. All the trial court
has done is to construe the existing agreement. It
has determined that in legal effect it is a chattel
mortgage and not a conditional sales contract. Once
that determination has been made the remedies and
the rights of the parties follow in accordance with
the rules of law pertaining to chattel mortgages.
If one of those rules is that the only remedy available to a mortgagee under a chattel mortgage in the
event of default is to foreclose in accordance with
the statute, notwithstanding agreements of the party
to the contrary, the court is bound by that rule of law
and must follow it as the trial court did in this case.
The plaintiffs in their attack on the trial court
for so called "rewriting the contract" bases most
of their criticism on the idea that plaintiffs were
only able to satisfy the balance due under the contract out of the property sold and that plaintiffs
could not get a personal judgment against defendants. The thing that plaintiffs overlook is that the
defendants paid the sum of $10,791:59 of the purchase price at the time of the execution of the contract. As security for the payment of the balance
of $25,408.41, defendants not only gave plaintiffs
a chattel mortgage on the property purchased from
plaintiffs but also gave plaintiffs a chattel mort29
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gage on the one-half interest owned by defendants
which presumably was worth the sum of $36,200.00
the same as the plaintiffs one-half interest was
worth. We do not think this has anything to do
with the case, but we do want to avoid any erroneous impression being made that plaintiffs were not
adequately secured.
Again we call the courts attention to the fact
that defendants stand ready, willing and able at any
time to pay all past due installments to plaintiffs.

CONCLUSION
'1'he defendants positio11 in this case is as follows:
1. The trial court was correct in holding that
the agreement in question was in legal effect a chattel mortgage, and this is so because:
a. Paragraph II of the agreement provides, "That sellers shall and hereby do convey to
buyers an undivided one-half interest in and to certain described property".
b. Title passed to the defendants at the
time said agreement was executed.
c. Defendants prior to the execution of
the agreement had title to a one-half interest in the
property sold under said agreement.
d. Paragraph V and VI of the agreement
clearly indicate the intention of the parties that
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plaintiffs are to acquire a security interest in the
property sold and also in the property owned by the
defendants prior to the execution of the agreement.
This could only be done by a chattel mortgage.
e. A necessary element of a conditional
sales contract is that the seller retain title as security for the payment of the purchase price. If
title passes by the terms of the agreement, there is
only one way to give the seller a security interest
in the property sold, and that is by ·chattel mortgage.
2. Plaintiffs did not accelerate and declare
due all of the installments under the agreement.
a. The letter of August 1'7, 1959, Exhibit P-4, is equivocal and states that the remedy of
foreclosure or the remedy of forfeiture and taking
over the business may be pursued. Acceleration goes
only with foreclosure. It has nothing to do with
forfeiture.
b. Only one of the plaintiffs signed the
letter of August 17, 1959. It was not signed by both
plaintiffs. It was addressed to only one of the defendants. It should have been addressed to both defendants to constitute a valid exercise of the option
to accelerate. Plaintiffs being joint owners of the
mortgage had to join in exercising the option to
accelerate. Failure to so join made the attempted
acceleration ineffective.
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3. A tender of all unpaid installments was
made by defendants on September 1, 195'9, and was
refused by the plaintiffs.
a. If the August 17, 1959, letter could
be construed as a declaration of intention to accelerate the payments, the actions of the plaintiffs
thereafter were 'Clearly inconsistent with exercising the option to accelerate and foreclosing a
mortgage. A mere declaration of intention to accelerate is not sufficient but to be effective as stated
by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in Union Central
Life Insurance Company v. Adams, 169 ·Okla. 572,
3'8 P. 2d 2'6,

"The declaration must be followed by
an affirmative act towards enforcing the declared intention."
The letter of September 11, 1959, Exhibit
P-5, from plaintiffs' attorney clearly abandons the
remedy of foreclosure which is the only remedy that
would have to be preceded by an exercise of the
option to accelerate.
b. The filing of the complaint on the
theory of a forfeiture and not on the theory of a
foreclosure was clearly an act inconsistent with
enforcing the declared intention contained in the
letter of August 17, 1959, to accelerate the payment and hence was either a waiver or abandonment of such declared intention or rendered the dec32
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laration to accelerate ineffective because such declaration was not followed by an act toward enforcing the declared intention but was followed by an
act clearly inconsistent with such declared intention.
4. The tender made by defendants on September 1, 1959, January 18, 1960, and January
20, 1960, of the sums due under the contract were
made before an effective election to accelerate and
therefore bars acceleration of the entire debt.
Since the agreement is in legal effect a
chattel mortgage, the only remedy ·available to plaintiffs in the event of default was to accelerate the
payments and to foreclose the chattel mortgage in
accordance with the statute. The provisions of the
agreement for a strict foreclosure contrary to the
statute and the provisions of the agreement for a
forfeiture contrary to the remedy provided by statute are unenforceable.
5.

If the judgment is ·affirmed, the plaintiffs
will still get their money with interest and justice
will have been done between the parties.
6.

The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
McBROOlVI & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendants
and Respondents
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